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The focus of my research is dynamic political economy in macroeconomics.  The 
first chapter of my dissertation studies the fact that Countries in the Organization of 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) vary widely in their ratio of capital tax 
rates to labor tax rates.  This chapter’s motivation is the strong negative correlation between 
the capital/labor tax ratio and old dependency ratio (defined as the ratio of population older 
than 65 years old to population between 20 and 65 years old) among 21 OECD countries. I 
study a parsimonious overlapping generations (OLG) majority voting model.  In 
equilibrium, the retired households and relatively old working households hold a large 
amount of capital and vote for a low capital tax rate (implying a high labor tax rate), while 
relatively young working households hold a small amount of capital and vote for a high 
capital tax rate (implying a low labor tax rate).  As a result, the model implies that countries 
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with more old people have relatively lower capital taxes.  The model takes the old 
dependency ratio as given and delivers a capital/labor tax ratio chosen by the median voter. 
The calibrated model presented here can generate not only this negative correlation, but 
also the tax ratios for the 21 OECD countries studied.  In the second chapter, I extend the 
first chapter and study the Japanese economy and taxation for the past three decades. 
Population aging is a serious social issue in Japan.  This chapter also shows that 
demographics is an important variable to explain the time series data of capital and labor 
tax rates.  Interestingly, the model predicts that a benevolent or utilitarian government 
would set a capital tax rate to be zero as in many standard tax models.  This result 
emphasizes the importance of modeling a political economy, as opposed to a standard 
social planning economy that has been extensively used previously.  Finally, the third 
chapter focuses on US immigration policy.  Illegal immigration from Mexico to the United 
States has been a hot topic to academic researchers and policy makers.  This study 
quantitatively investigates the welfare effects of illegal immigration to native households in 
the US.  More specifically, I simulate the model economy when the government deports 
every illegal immigrant.  The simulation shows that the social welfare increases by 0.01 
percent on average, and the poorest households’ welfare increases by 0.1%.  Although, 
initially, there is a decrease in the interest rate and the unemployment rate as well as an 
increase in the wage, these variables in the no-illegal-immigrant steady state are almost 
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This chapter uses a parsimonious overlapping generations (OLG) dynamic
majority voting model to explain a wide variation in the ratio of capital tax
rates to labor tax rates among OECD countries, by linking the capital/labor
1
tax ratios to the demographics of the countries. The data from 21 OECD
countries show that a country with an older population has a capital tax rate
that is relatively low in comparison to its labor tax rate. A country with
a younger population has a labor tax rate that is relatively high compared
to its capital tax rate. In the model, retired households and relatively old
working households depend more on income from wealth accumulated during
their working years (and hence prefer a lower capital tax rate to a lower labor
tax rate), whereas relatively young working households depend more on labor
income (and hence prefer a lower labor tax rate to a lower capital tax rate).
The intergenerational conict is modeled by developing a dynamic majority
voting model in a small open economy. A political economy model is well-
suited to capture such generational conicts in tax preferences. I calibrate
the model to match properties of each OECD country, and then evaluate the
response of the tax policies to the observed di¤erence in demographics. The
model is successful in explaining the relationship between the tax ratio and
demographics, both quantitatively and qualitatively.
Figure 1 displays the facts to be explained in this study. First, there
is a strong negative correlation between the capital/labor tax ratio and old
dependency ratio (dened as the ratio of population older than 65 years old to
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population between 20 and 65 years old) among 21 OECD countries. Second,
the tax ratios vary between 0.3 and 1.5. Third, there is a nonlinear relationship
between the tax ratios and old dependency ratios. Once the old dependency
ratio reaches a certain level, the tax ratios become insensitive to changes in the
old dependency ratios. Thus, the relationship between the old dependency
ratios and tax ratios is nonlinear.
Retired households do not have any labor income and thus, do not pay
any labor income tax. Therefore, they desire a low capital tax rate. Among
working households, there is a wealth distribution. Typically, the younger
the household is, the smaller amount of assets it holds. Working households
with a large amount of assets desire a low capital tax rate since a large pro-
portion of their income comes from capital income. Working households with
a small amount of assets may prefer a low labor tax rate. However, their tax
preferences are not as intuitive as the retired households, especially when the
tax policy is sticky in a sense that the tax rates do not signicantly change
year to year. The reason that working households with few assets may pre-
fer low tax rates is that they accumulate assets over time and start paying
more and more capital taxes. Two typical assumptions in the heterogeneous
agent model literature help us to understand why working households may
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prefer a low labor tax rate: credit constraint and risk aversion. Consider a
risk-averse young household who has just entered a labor market without any
assets. She wants to smooth her consumption over her lifecycle, but she is
credit-constrained. A low labor tax rate gives her more after-tax labor income
so that she can consume more today, and potentially save more for her retire-
ment days. Therefore, under these conditions, young working households may
prefer a low labor tax rate.
To link the old dependency ratio to the tax ratio and to capture the mech-
anism described in the previous paragraph, I use a parsimonious OLG model
with uninsurable, idiosyncratic retirement shocks and death shocks, similar to
Gertler (1999). A reasonably parameterized model can generate an old de-
pendency ratio that is comparable to the observed old dependency ratio in the
data. Further more, with incomplete markets, the model is able to generate
a reasonable asset distribution that mimics the fact that people accumulate
more capital over time until they retire. I also use a political recursive com-
petitive commitment equilibrium concept developed by Krusell and Rios-Rull
(1999), and extended by Corbae, DErasmo, and Kususcu (2008) (henceforth,
CDK). Specically, tax rates are endogenously determined by a median voter
with commitment.
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Since the basic idea and intuition of this study are simple, one may question
why we need such a complicated innite-horizon political economy model. De-
veloping a dynamic model, as opposed to a static model, is necessary because
capital is a dynamic variable by denition and householdsdynamic asset ac-
cumulation behaviors a¤ect their tax preference as well. For example, workers
younger than 30 years old and workers older than 50 years old hold a di¤erent
amount of assets and make di¤erent saving decisions. Therefore, their tax
preferences are di¤erent as well. Ideally, one can develop an innite-horizon
OLG model in which each agent lives for as many as 65 years. However, this
is computationally too time-intensive. The main question in this chapter is
not only qualitative (the correlation being negative), but also quantitative (I
measure the success of my model by looking at the level of predicted tax ratio
as well). A simple two or three period OLG model or innite-horizon OLG
model in which agents live only for two periods cannot be easily taken to the
data. My model is simple enough to compute, and at the same time, rich
enough to capture the important mechanisms and generate heterogenous tax
preferences among households.
The specic experiment this chapter considers is to calibrate the economy
from a standard real business cycle (RBC)/growth model as well as the old
5
dependency ratio data in Figure 1. Only heterogeneity across countries consid-
ered here is heterogeneity in the old dependency ratio, leading to heterogeneity
in the retirement probability and the death probability. I compute the equi-
librium tax ratio for each country. The calibrated model generates a strong
negative correlation between the old dependency ratio and the capital/labor
tax ratio. The model not only generates the right negative correlation, but
also matches the level of tax ratio. Further more, the model generates a
non-linear relationship, such that the tax ratio becomes less sensitive to the
changes in the demographics when the old dependency ratio is high as in the
data.
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Figure 1.1 (Pairwise Correlation)
x axis - old dependency ratio, y axis -  k= l
There exists a large volume of the literature on capital and labor taxation
(Chamley, 1986). However, most quantitative work has been done exclusively
for the US economy (Klein and Rios-Rull, 2003; Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger,
2006; Domeij and Heathcote, 2004). The studies that come closest to a dis-
cussion of cross-country di¤erences in the e¤ective capital and labor tax rates
are Klein, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2005), and Mendoza and Tesar (2005).
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Klein, Quardini, and Rios-Rull explain why the US government taxes capital
income more heavily than all major EU countries except the United Kingdom.
In their two country model, (exogenous) di¤erences in population and govern-
ment expenditure as a share of GDP play an important role. Time-consistency
also plays an important part in determining equilibrium tax rates. Mendoza
and Tesar investigate the role that international tax competition among EU
countries may play. Their two country models are successful in explaining the
fact that the United Kingdom taxes capital income more than continental EU
countries such as Germany. However, their models are still limited to only
two country settings. In summary, the previous literature focuses heavily on
the US economy, and the cross-country comparison of tax rates has not been
explored extensively. What distinguishes this study from these previous stud-
ies is that, rst, it studies 21 countries for two di¤erent time periods in a small
open economy model, and, second, it links demographics and tax rates using
a political mechanism. This study develops a theoretical model to explain
this relationship and also successfully replicates the tax ratios of a large set of
countries.
The rest of this study is organized as the following: Section 2 presents the
facts about the tax ratio of OECD countries. Section 3 describes the model.
8
Section 4 presents the calibration and numerical results. Section 5 concludes.
1.2 Facts
To measure the relationship between demographics and tax rates, some
moments to capture demographics and tax rates need to be dened and incor-
porated into the model. Statistics such as the median age, the total fertility
rate, the population growth rate, and the old dependency ratio can be used to
capture demographics or age distribution of population. The old dependency
ratio measures the important demographics in this study. The old dependency
ratio is the ratio of people older than 65 to those between 20 and 65 years old.
Age 65 is chosen as the cuto¤ line because in many OECD countries people re-
tire at the age of 65 and retired households have a di¤erent mix of capital and
labor income than working (young) households. Thus, retired households and
working households may vary in their preference of capital and labor taxes.
This study adopts the denition of Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000), which
is a revision of Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1996), commonly used in the
literature. The tax rates reported in these studies are similar, and highly
correlated. Their methodology of estimating capital, labor, and consumption
tax rates, is to carefully categorize tax revenues and incomes into capital tax
9
revenue, capital income, labor tax revenue, labor income, and consumption
tax revenue. Labor tax revenue, labor income, and consumption tax revenue
are easily identied in the data. If tax revenue is not from a labor tax or a
consumption tax, it is classied as capital tax revenue. Similarly, if income
is not from labor income, it is classied as capital income. In other words,
capital tax revenue and capital income are residuals. Once the tax revenue
and income are categorized, the tax rates are simply dened as the ratio of each
tax revenue to each income. Not only are the US e¤ective tax rates di¤erent
from other OECD countries, but also countries vary widely in their e¤ective
capital and labor tax rates. This large variation motivates the extension of
tax analysis from only the US economy to multiple economies in the OECD
countries, though these studies do not address reasons for the variation in tax
rates among them.
This study also uses tax ratios to summarize the capital and labor tax rates
across countries. The tax ratio is dened as capital tax rate divided by labor
tax rate ( k= l).  l is dened as
 l = 1  1  e l
1 +  c
;
where e l is the tax rate on labor income and  c is the consumption tax. This
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denition of labor tax rate is standard in the literature since both labor income
taxes and consumption taxes distort labor supply decisions.
One caveat of the denition used by Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar, and Carey
and Tchilinguirian is that the tax rates reported are technically average e¤ec-
tive tax rates, not marginal tax rates. Economists are more interested in
marginal tax rates since they determine household consumption, saving, and
labor supply decisions. In practice, (income) tax rates are typically not at,
but progressive. However, it is hard to create a comparable progressive tax
data for many countries. Progressive taxes also complicate a structure of the
model signicantly. In addition, many optimal or political taxation studies
in macroeconomics only have at tax rates (Chamley, 1986). The model pre-
sented here also has at tax rates, and in this class of model, the average and
marginal tax rates are equivalent.
Using the variables dened above, I investigate the relationships between
the old dependency ratio and tax ratio. Figure 1 shows a pair-wise correlation
between the capital/labor tax ratio and the old dependency ratio. Data from
21 OECD countries for the 1980s are reported in this gure. The intention of
this model is to replicate the negative correlation, the level of tax ratios, and
the non-linear relationship, presented in Figure 1. The pair-wise correlation
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results for the 90s is very similar, and without Japan being at the very top-left
corner, the correlation is signicantly negative. United Kingdom is excluded
from the sample for their unique tax structure. In UK, the government taxes
oil usage by rms, which increases the capital tax rate. In addition, the
rms also pay taxes for wages that the rms pay to the employees, instead
of employees paying the labor income tax. This increases the corporate tax
rate, which is a part of capital tax rate, and decreases the labor income tax
rate. Therefore, although UK has a relatively high old dependency ratio, the
capital/labor tax ratio is high.
To check the robustness of this negative correlation, I use the panel struc-
ture of the data set, to estimate some reduced form relationships. Carey and
Tchilinguirian report the capital and labor tax rates for three di¤erent peri-
ods; 1980-1985, 1986-1990, and 1991-1997. The demographics do not change
signicantly within a few years. At the same time, to control for xed country
e¤ects, I need a panel structure. Therefore, I take the average of the entire
1980s so that I have two di¤erent time periods with a large enough variation
in the old dependency ratios within countries. The dependent variable is the
tax ratio. The panel data allows me to include country specic xed e¤ects,
and to measure within country variation in the old dependency ratio and tax
12
ratio. The independent variables include the old dependency ratio, the size
of government consumption, the size of social security replacement rate, and
the size of population relative to the rest of the world. Klein, Quadrini, and
Rios-Rull (2005) consider the size of government consumption and population
as important variables. Social security may also play a role since demograph-
ics and social security are often linked together. In the model of Phelan
and Stacchetti (2001) and Klein and Rios-Rull (2003), the level of government
commitment is negatively correlated with the tax ratio. However, in the data
there seems to be no correlation between frequency of national elections and
the tax ratio. The frequency of an election is a measure of the level of gov-
ernment commitment that is excluded because it exhibits almost no variation
across time and is captured by the country xed e¤ects. Table 1 summarizes
the results of the regression analysis. The relationship between the old de-
pendency ratio and the tax ratio is signicantly negative, and interestingly,
not linear. After introducing a quadratic term for the old dependency ratio,
the negative relationship still holds even in the xed e¤ects panel regression.
From the above analysis, one can see that the negative correlation between the
old dependency ratio and tax ratio is robust to various model specications
and the inclusion of country specic xed e¤ects, even though the data has
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only 21 countries for two di¤erent time periods. This correlation needs to be
explained in a more theoretical, structural model.
Table 1.1 : OLS and Fixed E¤ect Regression Analysis (Y =  k= l)
OLS Fixed E¤ects
Old Dependency Ratio -3.44*** -42.38*** -2.84 -26.59**
(1.05) (8.90) (2.39) (10.25)
(Old Dependency Ratio)2 83.24*** 54.44**
(18.94) (23.01)
Social Security Replacement Rate -0.25 0.24 0.47 0.46
(0.29) (0.26) (0.39) (0.34)
(Government Consumption)/(GDP) -0.45 -2.01 -0.57 0.38
(1.55) (1.29) (4.10) (3.59)
Relative Population Size 1.69*** 1.63*** 31.58 39.38
(0.45) (0.36) (22.67) (19.94)
Standard errors in parentheses
*** - statistically signicant in 1% level
** - statistically signicant in 5% level
The statistical analyses above cannot conclude that di¤erences in the old
14
dependency ratio cause the di¤erences in the tax ratio. One counter argument
is as follows: since labor taxes include social security tax by denition, one
may suspect that this negative correlation is simply driven by the di¤erence in
the social security tax rate. However, the xed e¤ects estimations show that
the coe¢ cient on the social security replacement rate is not signicant and is
actually positive, not negative. Thus, the estimation results show that the
negative correlation between the old dependency ratio and the tax ratio is not
simply driven by the di¤erence in the social security tax rate. The reduced
form estimations also indicate that size of government consumption as a share
of GDP is not signicantly correlated with the tax ratio. This insignicant
correlation for government consumption helps us understand why a high social
security tax may not directly imply a low capital/labor tax ratio. For example,
even when social security benets are large and social security tax rate needs
to be high in order to nance social security, the government still has a choice
to subsidize labor income and tax capital heavily to nance the government
expenditure. This point is further discussed when the government budget
constraint is dened in the model section.
1.3 Parsimonious Small Open Economy Dynamic
OLG Majority Voting Model
15
Young, working agents depend more on labor income than capital income,
and prefer a low labor tax rate to a low capital tax rate, whereas retired
agents depend mainly on capital income, and prefer a low capital tax rate to
a low labor tax rate. To formally model the idea and quantify the e¤ect of
the di¤erence in demographics on the tax rates, this study develops an OLG,
political economy model of capital and labor taxation in a small open economy
context.1
1.3.1 Demographics
Amodel economy consists of a unit-measure continuum of households with-
out access to private insurance markets. Households go through two stages,
but not necessarily two model periods, of life: a working/young stage and
a retirement/old stage. A young, working household faces a country specic
constant probability of retiring during each period, 1 !i, and a retired house-
hold faces a country specic constant probability of dying during each period
1  i: Young households without any asset replace the old households when
they die. This implies that the average working period is 1=(1  !i) and the
average retirement period is 1=(1   i): Therefore, the average lifespan is,
1Mateos-Planas (2007) develops a di¤erent model with the same idea and explains a
decrease in the capital tax rate in the US in the past 50 years.
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1=(1  !i) + 1=(1  i):
If appropriately parameterized, this framework generates realistic average lengths
of the working period, the retirement period, and the total lifespan. Let Nt
be the number of young working households at t: Then, (1  !i)Nt of young





This model may look non-standard. However, it actually nests both a stan-
dard innitely lived agent model and a standard OLG model in which agents
live for only two periods. When ! = 1; the model becomes an innitely lived
17
agent model, since the young never retire or die, and there is no retired house-
hold. When ! = 0 and  = 0; the model becomes a standard innite-horizon
OLG model in which agents live only for two periods, since the young become
old with probability one and the old die with probability one.
1.3.2 Households
Households maximize their expected lifetime utility. I assume that the
period utility function has the form introduced by Greenwood, Hercowtiz and













where  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, " is the intertemporal (Frisch)
elasticity of labor supply, ct is consumption, and lt denotes labor supply in
period t: As described above, each young household faces an uninsurable,
idiosyncratic retirement shock. An individual household can self-insure by
holding at units of asset which pays a risk free rate of return r: Follow-
ing Gertler (1999), I assume that there is an annuity market for the retired
households. All the assets that newly deceased retired agents have remaining
is collected and redistributed, proportionally, to the rest of the surviving re-
tired households. The existence of an annuity market simplies the model by
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eliminating any accidental bequest. This assumption also helps the model to
capture the fact that retired households do not dissave as much as a standard
model predicts. There exists a borrowing constraint. Since dying with a
negative amount of assets creates a problem, following Cagetti and De Nardi
(2004), I assume no borrowing.
This utility specication has been widely used (Heathcote, 2005, and Cor-
bae, DErasmo, and Kuruscu, 2008, are recent examples in a similar class of
the model). Heathcote (2005) uses this preference specication to investi-
gate Ricardian equivalence in a heterogenous agent economy with aggregate
uncertainty. In this specication, the labor supply is independent of house-
holds asset level. Researchers have not been able to nd any strong e¤ects
of changes in the wealth level to the labor supply. This utility specication
is consistent with that observation.2
1.3.3 Firms
There also exists a continuum of identical rms in the economy. I assume
that the market is perfectly competitive and the production function is con-
stant returns to scale. Thus, the number of rms can be normalized to one
in equilibrium. A rm uses labor and capital as inputs and maximizes the







t  WtLt  RtKt; (2)
where capital letters denote aggregates. Lt denotes aggregate e¤ective labor
supply. I assume that production takes place with constant returns to scale
function. Capital depreciates at the rate, : Capital can be traded freely















where r is the world real interest rate.
1.3.4 Government
The government collects tax revenue from capital income and labor income,
and nances exogenous government expenditure G and social security benets.










is balanced in every period, where At is the aggregate asset holding, which may
be di¤erent from the aggregate capital stock, Kt: For many OECD countries,
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there is a separate social security budget and tax that is specically levied to
nance social security benets. Since the social security tax is a part of labor
income tax, whether or not the government has a separate budget constraint
does not matter in my analysis.3 Large social security benets apparently
induce a high labor tax rate. However, this is not always the case. I can



















Larger bt leads to a higher  bt : However, the government (or the median voter)
could choose  lt to be very low or even negative, such that 
l
t does not neces-
sarily increase as bt increases: The reduced form analysis in the introduction
also shows that b and  k= l are not signicantly correlated.
In this budget constraint, I implicitly assume that the capital tax rate
is residence-based instead of source-based. Among the OECD countries,
individual taxes are typically residence-based and corporate taxes are often
3I computed the model with one government budget constraint and with two separate
budget constraints for the government consumption and social security benets and got
exactly the same quantitative results.
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source-based. However, there are treaties and tax-deductibles where even
the corporate tax rates can be approximated to be residence-based (Frenkel,
Razin, and Sadka, 1991). For the model to be constrained to one political
parameter ( k in my model), I cannot allow the government to issue debts.
Later in my voting case, households vote over the future permanent capital
tax rate  k0, and this government budget constraint pins down labor income
tax, f ltgt1; since Gt and bt are exogenously given to the government.
1.3.5 Recursive Formation of the Problem
Let the distribution of capital for the young and old be denoted as  yt (at)
and  ot (at), and the joint distribution of capital be denoted as  (at; s) 
[ yt (at); 
o
t (at)] ; where s 2 fy; og Let the law of motion be  t+1 = H( t;  kt ):
Note that since I assume a balanced budget, so once  k is determined,  l is
also determined by the government budget constraint. Then the aggregate




and the total population is normalized to one.
I write my problem using dynamic programing. An old household solves
v(a; o;  ;  k) = max
fc;a0;lg
u(c; l) + iv(a




1 + r(1   k)
i
a+ bwl; (11)
 0 = H( ;  k); (12)
 k0 = 	( ;  k): (13)
where the law of motion for the asset distribution and capital tax rate is H
and 	; respectively, and l is the average labor supply of the young. Since the
government provides an annuity market, old households who survive receive a
higher return than just r. A young household solves
v(a; y;  ;  k) = max
fc;l;a0g
u(c; l) + 

!iv(a







1 + r(1   k)

a+ wl(1   l); (15)
 0 = H( ;  k); (16)
 k0 = 	( ;  k): (17)
The only sources of uncertainty or risk are the retirement shocks and death
shocks. The death shock is insured by the annuity market. The retirement
shocks are only partially insured by social security. This retirement shock
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with incomplete markets plays an important role in mimicking the fact that
older working households have more savings than younger working households
in the data.
It is worth noting that there is no wage inequality in the model. In
the introduction, the rational for using the at tax system as opposed to more
practical, realistic progressive tax system was discussed. The model is written
such that there is no need for introducing the progressive tax system, since
every working household has the same labor income. In the real world, the
social security benet depends on the labor income level before the retirement.
The model is also consistent in this dimension due to no wage heterogeneity
among the young. The solution to the individuals problem generates decision
rules which I denote as
c = c(a; s;  ; 
k); (18)
a0 = a0(a; s;  ; 
k) (19)
l = l(a; s;  ; 
k) (20)
The utility function has the convenient property that the labor supply choice,







l(a; o;  ; 
k) = 0; (22)
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is independent of the consumption/savings choice. Thus, the aggregate labor





: Before moving to the endogenous determi-
nation of tax rate via a majority vote, it is useful to state a competitive
equilibrium with all the political parameters given.
Denition (RCE). Given 	( ;  k); a Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
is a set of functions fv; c; l; a0 ; ; H;w;  lg such that:
(i) given ( ;  k; H;	); the function v(:); c(:); l(:); and a0(:) solve the
households problem in (10) and (14).
(ii) Prices are competitively determined as in (3) and (4).
(iii) The government budget constraint (5) is satised.


















where newis the measure of new young agents and I is an indicator function.
1.3.6 Politico Economic Recursive Competitive Equi-
librium (Time Zero Voting with Commitment)
In this section, I endogenize the tax choice to households. In particular,
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I allow households to vote for a future permanent tax rate,  k0: It is as if
the government can commit to the future tax rate. In a recursive form,
 k00 = 	( 0;  k0) =  k0 for all  0 and  k0: The future labor tax rate adjusts
such that the government budget constraint is balanced every period. Since
households are rational and forward-looking, they evaluate the equilibrium
e¤ects of a tax rate they vote for, calculate the expected discounted utility
associated with each  k0; and choose the permanent future tax rate that gives
them the highest utility. Since households are heterogenous in two dimensions
(a and fy; og); I do not know who the median voter is until I construct the
distribution of "most preferred" tax rates. However, since the model has
only one political parameter to vote for, each households derived utility can
be numerically shown to be single peaked. Then, the median of the most
preferred tax rates is chosen.
To choose the most preferred tax rate for each household, the household
must choose among alternatives. Suppose that the household starts with
state vector as before (a; s; ;  k) and consider a permanent deviation for an
arbitrary future permanent tax rate,  k0. The old households problem is
given by
ev(a; o; ;  k;  k0) = max
fc;a0g
u(c; l) + iv(a




1 + r(1   k)
i
a+ bwl; (26)
 0 = eH( ;  k); (27)
 k00 = e	( 0;  k0) =  k08f 0;  k0g: (28)
A young household solves












1 + r(1   k)

a+ w(1   l)l: (30)
 0 = eH( ;  k); (31)
 k00 = e	( 0;  k0) =  k08f 0;  k0g: (32)
where eH denotes the law of motion for   induced by the deviation, while all
future distributions evolve according to H: Note that the future value function
v is given by the solution to the household problem in (10) and (14) of the
denition of a Recursive Competitive Equilibrium. A solution to this problem
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generates
c = ec(a; s;  ;  k;  k0); (33)
a0 = fa0(a; s;  ;  k;  k0); (34)
l = el(a; s;  ;  k;  k0): (35)
Each household votes for  k0 = argmax ev(a; s;  ;  k;  k0): As we can see in
these value functions, households need to compute a sequence of distributions
of assets in the future. Thus, the primary reason why a solution to the politico-
economic equilibrium is di¢ cult to nd is that the capital tax choice  k0 and
associated decision rules induce a new sequence of distributions ( 0; 00; :::).
The evolution of the joint distribution   is given by the equilibrium function
H( ;  k); such that
 0 = eH( ;  k;  k0)
 00 = H




 eH( ;  k;  k0)i
::::
Higher future capital tax rate choices, for example, imply the paths of aggre-
gate asset level, A; that are monotonically decreasing. This is because higher
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future capital tax rates generate decreases in individual savings that are re-
ected in the paths to the new invariant distribution associated with the high
future capital tax rate. The e¤ects of the tax change disappear slowly. In
the small open economy setting, the GDP and government consumption, G;
are constant. Therefore, as A monotonically decreases,  l monotonically in-
creases. More specically, holding the initial condition constant, choosing a
high future capital tax rate implies a low labor tax rate in the near future (not
necessarily forever). Since households value todays consumption more than
tomorrows consumption, especially for the young, working households, this
decrease in  l in the near future may make them better o¤.
Next, I dene the solution concept:
Denition (PRCE) : a Politico-Economic Recursive Competitive Equilib-
rium is:
(i) a set of functions fv; ;H;	;  lg that satisfy the denition of RCE,
(ii) a set of functions fev; ec; el;fk0g that solve (25) and (29), at prices that
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with continuation values satisfying (i).
(iii) in individual state (a; s)i; household i0s most preferred tax policy  k0i
satises
 k0i =  ((a; s)i; ; 
k) = argmax
k0
ev(a; y;  ;  k;  k0): (38)
(iv) the policy outcome function  kmedian = 	( ; 










The condition (iv) denes the median voter.
I only focus on a stationary equilibrium in this study.
Denition : (SSPRCE). A Steady State PRCE is a PRCE which satises
  = H( ;  k) and  k = 	( ;  k):
Thus, the stationary equilibrium is an equilibrium such that the initial tax
rates are equal to the voting outcome for the permanent future tax rates.
30
1.4 Numerical Analysis
I calibrate a small open economy model, using standard parameter values
from the neoclassical growth/RBC literatures. The major exercise is to com-
pute a capital and labor tax rate for each sample country (21 total simulated
data points) and compare them with the data. After calibration, to assess the
quantitative signicance of the relationship between the old dependency ratios
and the tax ratios, I feed the country-specic retirement and death probability
into the model to deliver a steady state capital and labor tax rates in each
country for each period.
1.4.1 Calibration
I need to calibrate the following 10 deep parameters: the world real interest
rate, r; the discount factor, the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, disutil-
ity from labor, and intertemporal elasticity of labor supply, f; ;  ; "g; re-
spectively, in preferences; the capital share and the capital depreciation rate,
f; g; in production; exogenous government consumption and social secu-
rity replacement rate, fg; bg; and country specic demographics parameters,
f!i; ig: Technically, size of government expenditure and social security re-
placement rate are endogenous variables. The regression analysis has shown
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that g and b are not signicantly correlated with tax ratios, and therefore, I
set g and b to be exogenous and equal to the sample averages. In addition,
this study focuses on how di¤erences in the demographics may a¤ect the tax
ratio, and allowing only one dimensional heterogeneity in demographics makes
it easy to see how much of the di¤erence in the tax ratios can be explained
by the di¤erences in demographics. Further more, as in Klein, Quadrini, and
Rios-Rull (2005), the size of government expenditure is negatively correlated
with the tax ratio, and this e¤ect is present in my model as well. It is di¢ cult
to write a model in which the size of government expenditure has no impact
on the tax ratio, and this is left for the future research. In summary, only the
demographics parameters are country specic, and all the other parameters
are common across sample countries.
The model period is 4 years. The world real interest rate, r, is 1:044 1 as
in a standard small open economy model for developed countries like Mendoza
(1991). This is based on the return to the US risk-free treasury bill. Although
my model has a life cycle structure, since there is an annuity market,  needs
to be the inverse of the world gross real interest rate,  = 0:964. I assume
that  = 1; so, the utility function becomes a log-utility function. The
disutility of labor,  ; is the only model specic parameter. The average
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hours worked is an informative moment to pin down this parameter in my
model. I set the average hours worked as 30% of total endowed time available
as in Heathcote (2005), when the model is computed for the US economy.
" is the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply. I set " = 0:3 since there
is little evidence of large labor supply responses to the changes in marginal
tax rates that occurred during the 1980s in the US (Slemrod and Bakija,
2000). Heathcote (2005) also sets " = 0:3 in his study of scal policy with
heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets.4 The capital share, ; is set
to be 0:33 as in a standard Growth/RBC model (Gollin, 2002). The capital
depreciation rate, ; is set to be 1  (1  0:06)4 (Stokey and Rebelo, 1995). g
is a share of government consumption excluding wages as a share of GDP. 8%
is the sample average. b is the social security replacement rate. I estimate
b for each country based on government expenditure for the old as a share of
GDP from SourceOECD, ; which consists of mainly cash benet for the old.
It can be written, mathematically, as
wbL' = Y: (40)
4This relatively conservative estimate for the elasticity makes sure that my result is not
generated by an unreasonably high elasticity. A very elastic intertemporal labor supply
typically helps an OLG model to have a high capital tax rate.
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Since w = (1  )KL  and Y = KL1 ; this equation can be written as
b =

'(1  ) : (41)
For the US in 1980s, b is estimated to be approximately 40%, which is con-
sistent with other studies. The sample average is 47%. Table 2 displays the
common parameters.
Table 1.2 (Common parameters)
t 4 years Model period
r 1:044   1 Mendoza (1991)
 0:964
 1 Log-preference
" 0.3 Heathcote (2005)
 1.8 Hours worked in the US calibration = 0.3
 0.33 Gollin (2002)
 1  (1  0:06)4 Stokey and Rebelo (1995)
b 0.47 Sample average social security replacement rate
g 0.08 Sample average government consumption
I assume that the average length of lifespan is 14 model periods. Young
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households enter into the economy when they are 20 years old and live for 56
years on average. Thus, on average their average lifespan is 76 years, which
is roughly consistent with the data. Then, I can write the probability of
becoming old as
(1  !) = 1
14  1=(1  ) : (42)
Thus,  is the only parameter to determine the demographics. Again, the
ratio of the old to the young, or the old dependency ratio, is
' =
1
14(1  )  1 : (43)
Thus,  is matched such that ' is equal to the old dependency ratio in the
data. Table 3 summarizes the distribution of f!i; ig. It is worth emphasizing
that except for  ; all of the deep parameters are chosen directly from the data,
and the choice is independent of my model.
Table 1.3 (Summary statistics for country specic parameters)
Parameter Mean STD Moments
! 0.0873 0.0026 (Common) average lifespan = 14 model periods
 0.4027 0.0560 Country specic old dependency ratio
1.4.2 Computation Algorithm
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It is instructive to describe how to nd a stationary polito-economic equi-
librium with commitment to understand some properties of the model.
There are three major steps in computing my one-time voting model. First,
I compute a steady state for di¤erent initial capital tax rates ( k): This
step is very similar to Aiyagari (1994). Since  l can be pinned down by
the government budget constraint, given  k; I can determine a steady state
competitive equilibrium. This is at t = 0: Then, each household in the
economy votes for the capital tax rate in the next period,  0k: I assume that
 0k stays constant forever from the next period on, t  1.
Second, I compute a transition from one steady state to another for each
possible combination of  k and  k0. Technically, the initial capital tax rate,
 k; and the future capital tax rate,  0k; are continuous variables and there are
innitely many initial steady states and new steady states. In the computation
I discretize the  k grid. So, there is only a nite number of steady states. By
computing the transition dynamics, I can nd an indirect utility of voting for
 0k for all possible 
0
k; given an initial  k:
Lastly, for each initial steady state, I determine who the median voter is by
looking at the distribution of the most preferred tax rate and what tax rate,
 0k; the median voter votes for.
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1.4.3 Model Properties and Results
There is no analytical proof of a single-peaked preference over tax rates,
existence of equilibrium, and uniqueness of equilibrium. Therefore, I show
these properties numerically. Figure 2 shows some selected indirect utility
functions for working households with di¤erent levels of initial asset holdings.
For example, a young household without any assets gets the highest utility
by voting for a high capital tax rate (the upper left graph). There are two
important model properties in Figure 2. First, tax preference (the indirect
utility function) is single-peaked. This single peakedness allows me to rank
all agents in the economy according to their tax preference. Second, there is
a one-to-one mapping from the initial asset holdings and most preferred tax
rate for the young households. The more assets a working household holds,
the lower capital tax rate she prefers. This is intuitive. Although the life-
cycle structure in my model is very simple, the model still generates working
households with di¤erent levels of assets; thus, it mimics the fact that older
working households have more capital than younger working households in the
data.
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Figure 1.2 (Preferences over  0k of young households with di¤erent initial asset level
The x-axis indicates for  0k
Figure 3 displays the mapping from the initial capital tax rate,  k; to
the voting outcome,  0k: Although I cannot prove analytically, this function
is monotonically decreasing. Therefore, there exists a stationary politico-
economic equilibrium and the equilibrium is unique. The reason that this
mapping is monotonically decreasing is because if an economy starts with a
low initial capital tax rate, there are large amounts of assets; i.e. the (capital)
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tax base is bigger. Figure 3 also shows that a zero capital tax rate is not
sustainable in a sense that it cannot be a stationary equilibrium outcome,
although the steady state average social welfare may be highest when  k = 0
for some parameterization.
Figure 1.3 (Existence of Stationary Equilibrium and Uniqueness)
Time zero voting with commitment does have two advantages compared to
sequential voting as in CDK. In time zero voting with commitment, politico-
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economic equilibrium exists and it is unique with reasonable parameter values.
In sequential voting, we need to nd laws of motion for asset distributions and
tax rates as in Krusell and Smith (1998). A problem is that there might not
be equilibrium law of motion for these variables. For example, R2 for the law
of motion for one of the aggregate variables in CDK is less than .95. This is
much lower than R2 in Krusell and Smith that is practically 1. There is no
theory of how high this R2 needs to be. Even if all the R2 is practically 1, we
still do not know if that is the only set of laws of motion. Thus, equilibrium
may not be unique. In addition, in CDK, the results from sequential voting
and time zero voting with commitment are very similar.
I nd that as long as there are more young households than old households,
the median voter is always a young household and the asset distribution for
the young is su¢ cient information to determine the median voter since the
old always vote for the zero capital tax rate and there is only one dimensional
heterogeneity among young households. At least when using a reasonable
set of parameters, there is a monotonic relationship between the amount of
assets young households own and their tax preference. More precisely, the
more capital they have, the lower capital tax rate they vote for. Thus, in
my model, there is something similar to a "median capital" as in Krusell
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and Rios-Rull (1999). Krusell and Rios-Rull show that a household with
the median capital is the median voter, although my model is closer to a
commitment equilibrium in CDK, where both the asset holding and current
labor productivity determines the median voter.
Given the single-peaked preferences, existence of the equilibrium, and its
uniqueness, I discuss how well the model is able to replicate the tax ratios in
the data. The capital tax rate from the model is a compound tax rate for
four years. Therefore, I need to derive the annualized capital tax rate. In
a small open economy model, the real interest rate is constant, and there is a
simple closed form mapping from the compound rate to the annual rate:

1 + rann(1   kann)
4
= 1 + r(1   k) (44)
 kann = 1 





The labor tax rate is not a compound rate, and there is no need for transfor-
mation like this.
Figure 4 shows the model prediction against the data from Carey and
Tchilinguirian (2000). The calibrated model generates a signicant negative
correlation between the old dependency ratio and the tax ratio, solely by the
di¤erence in the demographics. In addition, the model can match the level of
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tax ratio. In the calibration, a higher the old dependency ratio is positively
correlated with a high probability of retirement, and a low the probability of
death. Under a high old dependency ratio, young households face a higher risk
of retirement and expect a longer retirement period on average. Therefore,
the young accumulate more assets. In the simulation, the median voter of
a country with a high old dependency ratio has more assets than the median
voter of a country with a low old dependency ratio. Since the wage is con-
stant across countries (they are all small open economies with the same world
real interest rate), the median voter in a high old dependency ratio country
depends relatively more on capital income than the median voter in a low old
dependency ratio. Thus, the median voter in a high old dependency ratio
country chooses a lower capital tax rate. The calibration exercises conrm
that this di¤erence in the asset level of the median voter across countries,
generated by the di¤erence in demographics, is quantitatively important and
explains the signicant portion of the di¤erences in the tax ratio.
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Figure 1.4 (Model Prediction: diamond VS. Data: circle)
x axis - old dependency ratio, y axis -  k= l
The model can also generate the non-linear relationship between the old
dependency ratio and tax ratio. This is consistent with the fact that once a
country reaches a certain level of old dependency ratio, the tax ratio becomes
insensitive to the changes in the old dependency ratio. This result may not be
as intuitive as the previous results. In the model, the relationship between
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the old dependency ratio and death probability is non-linear. Equation (43)
can be written as








where the left hand side of the equation is probability of dying and ' is the old
dependency ratio5. This nonlinear relationship helps the model to generate
the nonlinearity in the main results. In summary, although the model has a
simple shock structure, the model is able to generate the negative correlation
between the old dependency ratios and the tax ratios and the average level of
the tax ratios, as well as the non-linear relationship.
1.5 Conclusion
This study investigates why the OECD countries tax capital income and
labor income di¤erently, especially focusing on the ratio of the capital tax rate
to the labor tax rate. First, I document a strong negative correlation between
the old dependency ratio and the tax ratio in the data. The regression analysis
shows that the old dependency ratio is the variable of primary importance in
5The retirement probability can be written as
(1  !) = 1
14
(1 + ') (47)
where the left hand side of the equation is probability of retirement.
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the determination of tax ratios. The intuition is that retired households who
depend mainly on capital income prefer a low capital tax rate to a low labor
tax rate, whereas working households do the opposite. Second, this study
develops a micro-founded dynamic OLG political economy of taxation and
calibrates the model to the data from 21 OECD countries. By extending
Gertler (1999), the model is simple enough to compute, and at the same time
rich enough to bring to the data. The calibrated model is able to generate
a signicant negative correlation between the tax ratio and old dependency
ratio. In addition, this model reects the fact that the tax ratio becomes less
sensitive to the changes in the demographics when the old dependency ratio
is high, as well as remarkably reecting the level of tax ratio.
Despite these promising results, the model may also have a few limita-
tions and weaknesses. First, this study just compares di¤erent steady state
equilibria. The demographics change over time. The model presented here
ignores the dynamic changes in demographics. Computing the sequence of
tax rates with transitions in demographics requires an assumption that an
economy converges to a certain steady state in the future. However, there
is no good economic theory of forecasting the future demographics, and it is
hard to predict such a steady state.
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Second, two possibly important political variables, government expenditure
and social security, are exogenous to the model presented here. It may be
important to endogenize the size of government expenditure and social security.
This extension may be di¢ cult in a majority voting model since this class of
model usually allows only one political parameter to vote for. Bassetto (2007)
has recently made some progress in this dimension by developing a sequential
Nash bargaining model between the young and the old. In his model, all
capital tax rates, labor tax rates, government expenditure, and social security
were endogenously determined. However, his model period was 30 years, and
there is no household with both capital and labor income, which makes it hard
to bring to the data. Extending his model in a less stylized setting may be
important.
Lastly, the quantitative exercise presented here focuses only on the het-
erogeneity in demographics. There is also variation in size of government
expenditure and size of social security. In the reduced form-estimations,
these variables are not signicantly correlated with the tax ratio. However,
this does not mean that size of government expenditure or size of social se-
curity is unimportant in a structural macroeconomic model. For example, in
Klein, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2005), size of government expenditure has a
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direct implication on the equilibrium tax rates. More specically, a country
with a large government expenditure has a low capital/labor tax ratio. My
model is not an exception. It is di¢ cult to develop a model that is insensitive
to changes in the size of government expenditure and social security for the
equilibrium tax rates. This is left for future research.
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Appendix 1.A Data Source
All the capital, labor, and consumption tax rates are taken from the tables
in Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000). Old dependency ratio is constructed,
using the age distribution data from UN. The size of population relative to
the rest of the world is dened as the size of population over 20 years old
relative to the total population over 20 years old among the all the sample
countries. The population data is also from UN. Government consumption
is from SourceOECD. And, social security replacement rate is constructed,
using the government expenditure for the old from SourceOECD.
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Chapter 2
A Political Consequence of
Population Aging on Capital
and Labor Tax Rates and
Social Welfare in Japan
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"Japans population is ageing fast and shrinking. That has implications for
every institution, and may even decide the fate of governments" (Economist,
2007)
2.1 Introduction
The demographics changes in Japan are fast and serious. From 1980 to
2000, the old dependency ratio6 increased from 13% to 25%, and it is estimated
to reach 50% by 2025. As in the quote from Economist, this may have a serious
implication for the di¤erent institutions and the government, and consequently
social welfare of the Japanese. Academic researchers have also been concerned
about the implication of population aging in Japan. Whereas their studies
mainly focus on the social security system, I study capital and labor tax rates.
As Japans population ages, the Japanese economy has experienced signicant
changes in tax policies. Using Mendoza, Razin, and Tesars denition of the
average e¤ective capital and labor tax rates (1994), the capital tax rate has
decreased from 42% to 35% and the labor tax rate increased from 29% to
6The data is from World Population Prospective (UN, 2006). The denition of old
dependency ratio is the ratio of population older than 65 years old to population between
20 and 65 years old.
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33% by looking at the 1980s average and the 2000s average (Figure 1)7. This
relationship between the e¤ective capital and labor tax rates and demographics
in Japan is interesting and important for the following reason. Pay-As-You-
Go social security system is a transfer mechanism from workers to retirees.
Reasonably assuming that workers depend more on a labor income and retirees
depend more on a capital income, lowering a capital tax rate and increasing
a labor tax rate also transfers some wealth from workers to retirees. This
mechanism may be as important as the social security mechanism, and needs
to be studied.
7Mendoza has the data upto 1996 on his website. I estimated the tax rates between 1997
and 2005 by using their method. I used OECD national accounts and revenue statistics.
Note that now the national accounts are based on SNA93. I dene e l = 1 (1  l)=(1+ c)
where e l is the labor tax rate in the graph.
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Tax Rates and Old Dependency Ratio
%
1980s 2000s
In this chapter, I ask whether the observe population aging can explain
some part of the decrease in the capital tax rate and the increase in the la-
bor tax rate between 1980s and 2000s in Japan. To answer this question
I use a parsimonious dynamic overlapping generations (OLG) political econ-
omy model. In the model, there are a working state and a retirement state.
Working households face uninsurable, idiosyncratic retirement shocks and re-
tired households face idiosyncratic death shocks, similar to Gertler (1999) and
Cagetti and DeNardi (2004). With incomplete markets, working households
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gradually accumulate assets to self-insure against the retirement shocks. This
precautionary savings mechanism reects the fact that older working house-
holds hold more capital than younger working households since they save for
their retirement. I, further, use a political equilibrium concept developed in
Krusell and Rios-Rull (1999) and extended by Corbae, DErasmo, and Kususcu
(2008). Specically, political outcomes are endogenously determined by a me-
dian voter with commitment who chooses a future, constant capital tax rate
(and a labor tax rate is set to satisfy the government budget constraint) that
is required to be consistent with a time-zero voting equilibrium with com-
mitment. In the model, the retired households and relatively old working
households depend more on capital income than labor income, and prefer a
low capital tax rate to a low labor tax rate, while relatively young working
households depend more on labor income than capital income, and prefer a
low labor tax rate to a low capital tax rate. As a result, the model shows
that an economy with more retired households have a relatively lower capital
tax rate and high labor tax rate.
The specic experiment I consider here is to calibrate the initial retirement
and death shock process using the old dependency ratio data and the average
life span in 1980s. Then, I re-calibrate the economy to match the increase
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in the old dependency ratio and ask what capital tax rate the median voter
would choose. The model is able to explain the decrease in the capital tax rate
and the increase in the labor tax rate solely by the increase in the old depen-
dency ratio. Another remarkable nding is that the utilitarian government
who maximize the social welfare would set the capital tax rate to be zero as in
many standard optimal capital tax studies (Chamley, 1986). Therefore, this
study shows that it is important to study a political economy model, instead
of a Ramsey type model, which economists have been using to analyze macro-
economic policy for decades. Given the success in explaining the changes in
capital and labor taxes, I use the model to predict how much the capital and
labor taxes may change in the next 20 years as population ages even more.
The model predicts that the capital tax rate would decrease to 26.53% and
the labor tax rate would increase to 45.86%.
The model is also useful in estimating changes in the social welfare as the
population ages, since people are concerned about what will happen to the
Japanese economy as the population ages signicantly. Assuming that the to-
tal factor productivity (TFP) grows at the annual rate of 1%, the social welfare
would increase by 1% if the capital and labor tax rates change endogenously
in the politico-economic equilibrium, while the social welfare would decrease
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by 1% if the capital and labor tax rates remain constant at their 2000s level.
The reason for this result is that as the population ages, the capital tax rate
decreases and converges to 0%, which is the capital tax rate that the utili-
tarian government would choose. Thus, the population aging may not be as
concerning as it may seem.
This study is not the rst study to link the demographics and capital
and labor tax rates in a political economy context. Mateos-Planas (2006)
studies the decrease in the capital tax rate in the US as the baby-boomers get
older. The main di¤erences from his work are that, rst, I study the Japanese
economy in which the changes in demographics seem to be more important;
second, I compare the political economy results with the utilitarian results and
nd a signicant di¤erence; third, I also study the welfare implication; forth,
I simplify his model signicantly by extending Gertler (1999) to reduce the
number of parameters to calibrate.
The chapter is organized as follows. I present the model in Section 2. In
Section 3, I discuss the calibration and computation of the benchmark model,
and presents the numerical results. Section 4 concludes.
2.2 Model
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I develop a type of OLG model with a majority voting mechanism8 that
simplies Mateos-Planas (2006) to be more tractable and to focus only on
the e¤ect of demographics. I model a production economy with idiosyncratic
shocks of retirement and death, and an incomplete market. In my model,
the productivity of young agents are set to be one and the productivity of old
agents are set to be zero. Once young agents receive a retirement shock, they
can never go back to the working state again. I model the Japanese economy
as a closed economy. This assumption is standard as in Hayashi and Prescott
(1999) and Chen, Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu (2006).
2.2.1 Demographics
A model economy consists of a unit-measure continuum of households
without access to private insurance markets. Households go through two
stages, not necessarily two model periods, of life: young/working stage and
old/retirement stage. A young, working household faces a constant proba-
bility of retiring during each period, 1   !, and a retired household faces a
constant probability of dying during each period 1 : Those who died are re-
placed by young households without any assets. Namely, the average working
8I use "majority voting model" and "median voter model" interchangably in this study.
See Corbae, DErasmo, and Kuruscu (2007) for why they are equivalent in this class model.
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period is 1=(1  !) and the average retirement period is 1=(1  ):
If appropriately parameterized, this framework generates realistic average lengths
of the working period, the retirement period, and the total lifespan. Let Nt
be the number of young working households at t: Then, (1   !)Nt of young
agents are born at t. The ratio of the retired to the working, '; is thus
'  1  !
1   :
This model may look non-standard. However, it actually nests both a stan-
dard innitely lived agent model and a standard OLG model in which agents
live for only two periods. When ! = 1; the model becomes an innitely lived
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agent model, since the young never retire or die, and there is no retired house-
hold. When ! = 0 and  = 0; the model becomes a standard innite-horizon
OLG model in which agents live only for two periods, since the young become
old with probability one and the old die with probability one.
2.2.2 Households Problem
Households maximize their expected utility. I use Epstein-Zin preference
as in Guvenen (2006a,b). There are several reasons for using Epstein-Zin pref-
erence. In the data, the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and intertemporal
substitution parameter are di¤erent (Guvenen, 2006a,b). CRRA preference
is a special case of Epstein-Zin preference where the coe¢ cient of relative risk
aversion and intertemporal substitution parameter are the same. Gertler
(1999) also uses a version of Epstein-Zin preference. From a computational
viewpoint, I can approximate the value functions for Epstein-Zin preference
more accurately with fewer grid points using a spline interpolation than for
CRRA preference. In CRRA preference, indirect utility goes to negative
innity as consumption goes to zero. On the other hand, in Epstein-Zin
preference, indirect utility is equal to zero when consumption is zero. This
implies that there is much more curvature around zero in CRRA preference
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ct + kt+1  wtet(1   lt    bt) + (1  et)wtbt + (1 + rt(1   kt ))kt (49)
ct  0; kt+1  k (50)
c and k denote consumption and capital, respectively. w is wage and r is
a risk-free rate of return on capital. e is labor productivity. e = 1 when
agents are young and working and e = 0 when agents are old and retired. b
is social security benet.  l is labor income tax and  k is capital income tax.
 b is social security tax, which is di¤erent from labor income tax, although
 b is levied only on the labor income. Consumption tax is ignored for two
reasons. First, in a majority voting model, I can have only one political
parameter to vote for. Otherwise, single-peakedness of tax preference may be
violated. Second, consumption tax is theoretically equivalent to labor income
tax and in the data I combine the consumption tax rate and labor tax rate.
 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor. Once an agent dies, ct is zero forever. 
is coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion.  = 1=(1   ) 1 is the intertemporal
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elasticity of substitution. This preference nests a standard CRRA preference
when 1   = . An individual household can self-insure against idiosyncratic
shocks by holding kt units of capital which pays a risk free rate of return rt:
No borrowing is permitted (k = 0) as benchmark, which limits the ability of
low-wealth households (new young agents) to smooth consumption. Allowing
households to borrow causes a problem since old households could die with
strictly negative asset holding. I assume that new born agents start with no
asset holding.
2.2.3 Firms Problem
There also exists a continuum of identical rms in the economy. I assume
that the market is perfectly competitive and the production function has a
constant return to scale. Thus, the number of rms can be normalized to one
in equilibrium. For simplicity, there is no corporate taxation. I need this
assumption for single-peakedness of the tax preference. A rm uses labor and
capital as inputs and maximizes the prot.
maxF (Kt; Nt) WtNt  RtKt (51)
where capital letters denote aggregates. Further,Nt is constant in my economy
and equal to measure of young households. I assume that production takes
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place with a constant return to scale function. Capital depreciates at the rate
: Perfect competition in factor markets implies
rt = FK(Kt; Nt)   (52)
wt = FN(Kt; Nt) (53)
2.2.4 Government
The government collects tax revenue from the capital income and labor in-




t rtKt + 
l
twtNt (54)
For the model to have one political parameter to choose, I cannot allow the
government to issue debts. Later in my voting case, households vote over
the capital income tax  k, and this constraint pins down the labor income
tax,  l: I also assume that the government provides an annuity market to the
old. The government collects all the asset which old agents who just died
have left and transfer it to the rest of the old households who have survived.
The existence of an annuity market simplies the model by eliminating any
accidental bequest to the new born agents. The government also provides pay-
as-you-go social security benet to the old. The budget for social security is
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independent from the budget for Gt: In Japan, social security is nanced by
tax specically for social security benet. I assume that social security is
entirely nanced through tax on the labor income with rate  b:
btwtNt
1  !
1   = 
bwtNt (55)
Note that 1 !
1  is the ratio of the young to the old. The left hand side is total
benet and the right hand side is total social security tax revenue. Since my
model is an incomplete market model with idiosyncratic shocks, one may ask
whether such risks are actually insurable or not. I assume that bt is exogenous
to the government since there is no change in b in the data that this study
looks at.
2.2.5 Recursive Formation of the Problem
Let the distribution of capital for the young and old be denoted as  yt (kt)
and  ot (kt), and the joint distribution of capital be denoted as  (kt; s) 
[ yt (kt); 
o
t (kt)] ; where s 2 fy; og Let the law of motion be  t+1 = H( t;  kt ):
Note that since I assume the balanced budget, once  k is determined,  l is also
determined by the government budget constraint. Then the aggregate capital





and the total population is normalized to be one. Nt is constant and the
measure of the young.
The economy-wide resource constraint in each period is given by
Ct +Kt+1 = F (Kt; Nt) + (1  )Kt (57)
I write my problem using dynamic programing. For a heuristic purpose
only, I write it as if  = 1   and the Epstein-Zin preference is equivalent to
a CRRA preference. Let u(c) = c1 =(1  ). An old agent solves
v(k; o;  ;  k) = max
fc;k0g
u(c) + v(k0; o;  0;  k0) (58)
subject to
c+ k0 =
1 + r(K)(1   k)

k + bw(K) (59)
 0 = H( ;  k) (60)
 k0 = 	( ;  k) (61)
where the law of motion for the asset distribution and capital tax rate is H
and 	; respectively. Since the government provides an annuity market, old
households who survive receive a higher return than just r. A young agent
solves











1 + r(K)(1   k)

k + w(K)(1   l    b) (63)
 0 = H( ;  k) (64)
 k0 = 	( ;  k) (65)
The solution to the individuals problem generates decision rules which I denote
c = c(k; s;  ; 
k) (66)
k0 = k0(k; s;  ; 
k) (67)
Before moving to the endogenous determination of tax rate by a via major-
ity voting or by a utilitarian government, it is useful to state a competitive
equilibrium with all the political parameters given.
Denition (RCE). Given 	( ;  k); a Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
is a set of functions fv; c; k0 ; r; w;  lg such that:
(i) given ( ;  k; H;	); the function v(:); c(:); and k0(:) solve the house-
holds problem in (11) and (15).
(ii) Prices are competitively determined as in (5) and (6).
(iii) The resource constraint is satised
K 0 = KN1  + (1  )K  
Z
c(k; s;  ; 
k)d (k; s) (68)
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(iv) The government budget constraint (7) is satised.

















where newis the measure of new young agents9.
(vi) the social security market clears
(1  )b = (1  !) b (71)
I also dene a stationary recursive competitive equilibrium
Denition (SRCE). A Stationary Recursive Competitive Equilibrium is a
special case of a RCE such that the aggregate variables and the distribution of
asset are invariant.
2.2.6 Politico Economic Recursive Competitive Equi-
librium
In this section, I endogenize the tax choice to households. In particular,
9new = N(1  !)
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I allow households to vote for a future permanent tax rate,  k0: It is as if
the government can commit to the future tax rate. In a recursive form,
 k00 = 	( 0;  k0) =  k0 for all  0 and  k0: The future labor tax rate adjusts
such that the government budget constraint is balanced every period. Since
households are rational and forward-looking, they evaluate the equilibrium
e¤ects of a tax rate they vote for, calculate the expected discounted utility
associated with each  k0; and choose the permanent future tax rate that gives
them the highest utility. Since households are heterogenous in two dimensions
(a and fy; og); I do not know who the median voter is until I construct the
distribution of "most preferred" tax rates. However, since the model has
only one political parameter to vote for, each households derived utility can
be numerically shown to be single peaked. Then, the median of the most
preferred tax rates is chosen.
To choose the most preferred tax rate for each household, the household
must choose among alternatives. Suppose that the household starts with
state vector as before (a; s; ;  k) and consider a permanent deviation for an
arbitrary future permanent tax rate,  k0. The old households problem is
given by
ev(k; o; ;  k;  k0) = max
fc;k0g




1 + r(K)(1   k)

k + bw(K) (73)
 0 = eH( ;  k) (74)
A young agent solves









1 + r(K)(1   k)

k + w(K)(1   l    b) (76)
A solution to this problem generates
c = ec(k; s;  ;  k;  k0) (77)
k0 = fk0(k; s;  ;  k;  k0) (78)
Each household votes for  k0 = argmax ev(k; s;  ;  k;  k0): As we can see in
these value functions, households need to compute a sequence of distributions
of assets in the future. Thus, the primary reason why a solution to the politico-
economic equilibrium is di¢ cult to nd is that the capital tax choice  k0 and
associated decision rules induce a new sequence of distributions ( 0; 00; :::).
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The evolution of the joint distribution   is given by the equilibrium function
H( ;  k); such that
 0 = eH( ;  k;  k0)
 00 = H




 eH( ;  k;  k0)i
::::
Higher future capital tax rate choices, for example, imply the paths of ag-
gregate asset level, K; that are monotonically decreasing. This is because
higher future capital tax rates generate decreases in individual savings that
are reected in the paths to the new invariant distribution associated with the
high future capital tax rate. The e¤ects of the tax change disappear slowly.
As K monotonically decreases,  l monotonically increases. More specically,
holding the initial condition constant, choosing a high future capital tax rate
implies a low labor tax rate in the near future (not necessarily forever). Since
households value todays consumption more than tomorrows consumption,
especially for the young, working households, this decrease in  l in the near
future may make them better o¤.
From each household choice I generate the distribution of "most preferred"
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tax rates and provided each households derived utility is single-peaked, the
median of the most preferred tax rates is chosen. To choose the most preferred
tax rate, the household must choose among alternatives. Suppose that the
household starts with state vector as before (k; s; ;  k) and consider a one
period deviation for next periods tax rate to  k0 which is not necessarily given
by  k0 = 	( ;  k). The households problem is given byI am ready to dene
the solution concept
Denition (PRCE) : a Politico-Economic Recursive Competitive Equilib-
rium is:
(i) a set of functions fv; ;H;	; r; w;  lg that satisfy the denition of RCE.
(ii) a set of functions fev; ec;fk0g that solve (25) and (28), at prices which

















with continuation values satisfying (i). And, the transfer is equal to accidental
bequest.
(iii) in individual state (k; s)i; household i0s most preferred tax policy  k0i
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satises
 k0i =  ((k; s)i; ; 
k) = argmax
k0
ev(k; y;  ;  k;  k0) (81)
(iv) the policy outcome function  km = 	( ; 







For now, I focus on a stationary equilibrium only.
Denition : (SSPRCE). A Steady State PRCE is a PRCE which satises
  = H( ;  k) and  k = 	( ;  k):
I can also see from Equation (37) that the ratio of the young to the old
explicitly a¤ects the median voter. By keeping my model simple and tractable,




I analyze how this change in demographics may a¤ect the average e¤ective
capital and labor tax rates in Japan after 1980 when the old dependency ratio
has increased signicantly. Another reason for focusing on the economy after
1980 is that in 1960s and 1970s the Japanese economy was still experiencing a
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rapid growth and it may not be suitable for a steady state type analysis. For
example, the TFP growth rate was 3.3% on average before 1980 and it has
dropped to 1.1% on average since 1980 (Hayashi and Prescott, 1999). The
saving rate was signicantly large and to explain such a high saving rate a
standard growth model needs to incorporate the rapid TFP growth into the
model (Chen, Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu, 2006). Tax policies in such a
growing economy is beyond a scope of this study. Social security was very
di¤erent before 1970 and the 1970s is the transition period.
The model period is four years to speed up the computation. The pref-
erence and production parameters are taken from a standard growth/RBC
literature.  = 0:964;  = 0:36;  = 3;  =  1:0; and  = 1   (1   0:09)4:
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is typically between 0.1 and 1. I
set it to be 0.5. Guvenen (2004) documents that stockholders IES is 1 and
non-stockholders IES is 0.1 in the United States. Since I do not have stock-
holders or non-stockholders, I pick the IES between the two. In Japan, the
social security benet is approximately 36% of the wage. This implies that
 b = 0:361 !
1  : I set G to be 23% of the GDP, which is the average government
consumption and investment as a share of GDP between 1980 and 2005. The
only parameters left to calibrate are f!; g: I use the average life span (14
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model periods) and old dependency ratio to calibrate these two parameters.
Fixing the average length of lifespan to be 14 model periods (56 years), I can
write the probability of becoming old as
(1  !) = 1
14  1=(1  ) (83)
Thus,  is the only parameter to determine the demographics. Again, the




For the 1980s calibration, ! = 0:082 and  = 0:5570: For the 2000s, ! = 0:091
and  = 0:3322: Table 1 summarizes the calibration for the 1980s.
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Table 2.1 (Calibration)
Parameters Values Moments to match or data source
t 4 years
 0:964
  1:00 Guvenen (2006a,b)
 3:00 CRRA (Carroll, 1998)
 0:36 capital share (Hayashi and Prescott)
 0:31 depreciation rate (Hayashi and Prescott)
1  ! 0:08 average lifespan = 14 model periods
1   0:56 old dependency ratio = 14%
b 0:36 social security replacement rate
g 0:23 government expenditure as a share of GDP
2.3.2 One-time Voting Algorithm and Results
It is instructive to discuss the computation algorithm in order to describe
the politico-economic equilibrium before showing the results. So, I will
start with an explanation of the computation algorithm developed by Corbae,
DErasmo, and Kurusucu (2008). There are three major steps in comput-
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ing my one-time voting model. First, I compute a steady state for di¤erent
initial capital tax rates ( k): This step is very similar to Aiyagari (1994).
Since  l can be pinned down by the government budget constraint, given  k;
I can determine a steady state competitive equilibrium. This is at t = 0:
Then, each household in the economy votes for the capital tax rate in the
next period,  0k: For simplicity, I assume that 
0
k stays constant forever from
the next period on, t  1. Figure 2 shows an invariant distribution of asset
holding. The model can mimic the fact that older working households (those
who remain young for many periods) accumulate more capital than younger
working households. Although the model has a very simple shock structure,
it can still generate a signicant amount of heterogeneity among households
so that median voting is non-trivial. For example, if a model was a standard
OLG model with only young and old households, the median voter would be
trivially young as long as the old dependency ratio is less than 0.5, and such a
model would not generate su¢ cient heterogeneity among households to study
political equilibrium.
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Figure 2.2 (Signicant Heterogeneity among Households)
Second, I compute a transition from one steady state to another for each
possible combination. Technically, the initial capital tax rate  k and the future
capital tax rate  0k are continuous variables and there are innitely many initial
steady states and new steady states. In the computation I discretize the  k
grid.10 So, there is only a nite number of steady states. By computing
the transition dynamics, I can nd an indirect utility of voting for  0k for all
10I do not need the range of k0 to be between 0 and 1. Here, I set k0 2 [0; 0:5]: This
speeds up the computation and does not change any results since the median voter does not
choose k0 > 0:5 in the calibration here.
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possible  0k; given an initial  k: Figure 3 shows the voting preference over
capital tax for di¤erent asset holding for the working households, holding the
initial capital tax rate constant. There is a one-to-one mapping from the
initial asset holdings and most preferred tax rate for the young households.
The more assets a working household holds, the lower capital tax rate she
prefers. In my calibration, old households always vote for 0. Thus, the
model is successful in reecting the basic economic intuition such that working
households who depend more on a labor income than a capital income prefer a
low labor tax rate, whereas retired households who depend more on a capital
income than a labor income prefer a low capital tax rate.
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Figure 2.3 (The Most Preferred Capital Tax Rate)
Lastly, for each initial steady state, I determine who the median voter is
by looking at the distribution of the most preferred tax rate and what tax
rate,  0k; the median voter votes for. Figure 4 displays the mapping from
the initial capital tax rate,  k; to the voting outcome,  0k: Although there
is no analytical proof, this function is monotonically decreasing. Therefore,
there exists a unique stationary equilibrium. The reason that this mapping
is monotonically decreasing is because if an economy starts with a low initial
capital tax rate, there are large amounts of assets; i.e. the (capital) tax base
77
is bigger. Figure 3 also shows that a zero capital tax rate is not sustainable
in a sense that it cannot be a stationary equilibrium outcome. When the
initial capital tax rate is equal to zero, the median voter would chooses as
high as 45% for the future capital tax rate, and this cannot be a stationary
equilibrium. However, the steady state average social welfare may be highest
when  k = 0 for some parameterization.
Figure 2.4 (Uniqueness of Equilibrium)
I compute a stationary politico-economic equilibrium for the 1980s, the
2000s, and the 2020s. Table 2 summarizes the results. My calibrated dy-
namic majority voting model shows that the change in demographics alone
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can explain the change in the e¤ective tax rates. The model slightly under-
predicts the capital tax rate. My model also predicts that the capital tax rate
continues to decrease to 25% and the labor tax rate continues to increase to
46% by 2025.
Table 2.2 (Data VS Model Prediction)
 k  l welfare ODR
Data 1980s 42.69 28.72 14%
2000s 35.14 33.36 30%
Model 1980s 43.88 26.95 1.09 14%
2000s 33.67 36.12 1.00 30%
2020s 26.53 45.86 1.01 47%
Another important result is that if a social planner was to set the tax rates
instead of the median voter, the social planner or utilitarian government which
maximizes the sum of indirect utilities would have set the capital tax rate to be
zero as in Chamley (1986). Given the distribution of capital, the mean voter
owns more capital than the median voter, which leads to a lower capital tax
rate in the utilitarian equilibrium, than in the politico-economic equilibrium.
This result highlights the importance of modeling political mechanism.
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The social welfare is simply dened as the average indirect utility and
normalized to the welfare in the 2000smodel prediction after adjusting for
the exogenous TFP growth rate of 1%. In this model, a high old dependency
ratio implies a low labor input. Therefore, the social welfare is expected
to be low as population ages. The model predicts that the decrease in the
social welfare is large. The expected social welfare actually increase by 1.2%
between the 2000s and 2020s because of the decrease in a capital tax rate. I
also compute the expected social welfare if there is no change in the tax rates.
In this case, the social welfare decreases by 1.5%. Thus, the e¤ect of the
endogenous decrease in the capital tax rate dominates the e¤ect of reduction
in labor input.
2.4 Conclusion
This study investigates the political consequence of population aging in
Japan, focusing on capital and labor tax rates. My calibrated majority voting
model can explain almost all of the changes in the capital and labor tax rates
in Japan and the model emphasizes the importance of demographics changes
in the determination of the capital and labor tax rates. The social planning
capital tax rate is zero as in many standard models because in the calibrated
model the median voter depends more on the labor income than the mean
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voter. Therefore, modeling a political economy is very important to explain
and understand tax rates in the real world. The model also predicts an
increase in the social welfare by the 2020s, because of the lower capital tax
rate.
There are two major future possible research topics. First, it is important
to test how the model prediction may change if one is able to compute a
model with dynamic demographics changes with sequential voting. This may
face signicant computational di¢ culty. Second, endogenizing both social
security benet and capital and labor tax rates may be interesting since they
could potentially play a similar role in redistributing some wealth from the
young to the old. This may also be di¢ cult to compute since, in this class of
political economy model, we can usually have only one political parameter to
vote for.
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Appendix 2.A Computational Algorithm for One-
time Voting
It takes approximately three hours to run the Fortran95 program for this
model.
Step 1: Calculating a steady state for exogenous tax rates ( k)
1. Guess a value for the aggregate capital stock K: This implicitly de-
termines r and w: Then, using the government budget constraint,  l is also
determined.
2. Solve for the households problem to nd the value function and decision
rules.
3. Find the time invariant distribution associated with the decision rules.
4. Check that the aggregate capital stock is consistent with the households
decision rules.
Step 2: Solving for transition path for exogenous tax rates
1. Choose t, the number of periods to reach a steady state.
2. For each  k0 = 
k




n; make an initial guess for the
sequence fKtgt

t=0; where Kt is the steady state level of capital associated
with  kn:
3. Starting in period t   1 with current capital Kj;nt 1 and future capital
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Kj;nt ; solve for vt 1(k; s;Kt 1; 
n) and k0;t 1(k; s;Kt 1; 
n) by solving the
value functions, with vt(k; s;Knss; 
n):
4. Continue solving backwards until t = 0:
5. Find the new path of the aggregate capital.
6. If the new sequence is close enough to the old sequence, done. Other-
wise, update the sequence by taking convex combination of the old and new
sequences.
Step 3: Finding the median voter.
1. For each ( kj ; j;ss); obtain  (k; s; 
k
j ; j;ss) for every (k; s)
2. Given  (k; s;  kj ; j;ss) and  j;ss; obtain a distribution of the most pre-
ferred tax rates.
3. Find the median  km of this distribution.






Equilibrium Analysis of Illegal
Immigration to the US
3.1 Introduction
Passel (2005) estimates the number of illegal immigrants in the United
States to be more than 10 millions in 2005, and the recent trend shows that
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the number may be even larger as of 2008 than that, which is approximately
6% of the US native labor force. The illegal immigration fromMexico accounts
for more than 50 percent of the total illegal immigration and researchers do
not have extensive data on illegal immigration from other countries. Due to
this data ability, I focus on illegal immigration from Mexico to the US. Aca-
demic researchers and policy makers are increasingly interested in the e¤ects
of the illegal immigration to the US economy. Immigration policy reforms
are always one of the hot policy topics discussed in the presidential election
campaigns. Typical arguments we hear on the news or see in academic jour-
nals are the following: the illegal immigrants take jobs away from the native
workers and the unemployment rate increases, the increase in the labor force
leads to a decrease in the wages and an increase in the interest rates. These
arguments seem reasonable and intuitive. The question is how quantitatively
important these e¤ects are, and ultimately how much these e¤ects may impact
the welfare of di¤erent individuals in the US. Furthermore, it is important to
study what illegal immigration policy reform the US government needs to im-
plement. To answer these question, I develop a two country dynamic general
equilibrium model, which can quantitatively explain the size of illegal immi-
gration. To analyze an impact of illegal immigration, one may start with no
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illegal immigration equilibrium and then simulate a transition to an equilib-
rium with illegal immigration. This approach is common in a trade model to
study the impact from a country opening up to international trades. How-
ever, I start with an equilibrium with illegal immigration simply because the
benchmark US economy does have illegal immigrants. For calibration, I need
some moments from the US and Mexican economy data. Since the actual data
is already reecting the e¤ects of illegal immigration, my benchmark model
needs to have illegal immigration. After calibrating a model, I simulate the
most extreme policy reform that is to deport all the illegal immigrants and not
to allow any more illegal immigrant to cross the border illegally. Other policy
reforms are between this extreme policy and the status quo. Therefore, this
exercise can shed lights on the upper bounds for e¤ects from di¤erent policy
reforms.
The rst step of this study of developing a reasonable, normative model
of illegal immigration seems di¢ cult because the previous studies have found
the number of illegal immigrants in the US to be too small, given the small
observable costs of crossing the border illegally (mainly, payments to smug-
glers) and the huge wage gap between the United States and Mexico and other
sending countries (see Hanson (2006) for the substantial survey which argues
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that this is a puzzle). Hanson (2006) argues that the reason for the small
number of illegal immigrants relative to what a standard model predicts is
unobserved costs of immigration: being away from home, not knowing the
language. These unobservable costs are very di¢ cult to be included in a
standard dynamic macroeconomic model. Even if we can write a model with
disutility from being away from home and not knowing English, it is hard to
calibrate the parameters regarding these unobservable costs.
Fortunately and surprisingly, I nd that the size of illegal immigration is
not too small if potential illegal immigrants are reasonably risk-averse. The
previous studies mainly in labor economics assume that potential illegal immi-
grants are risk neutral. This assumption may be necessary for a model to be
tractable enough to have a closed form solution, which leads to an economet-
rically testable implication. I use a calibrated dynamic general equilibrium
model to analyze the illegal immigration issue, and therefore, I can relax this
assumption of risk-neutrality and explain the size of the illegal immigration.
The key elements are risk aversion, wage uncertainty in the US, wage inequal-
ity and credit constraints in Mexico. In most previous studies, preferences are
typically linear (Borjas, 1987). This linear preference assumption creates this
puzzle for three reasons. First, when preferences are linear, only the mean
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wage in the US matters. The mean wage for the illegal immigrants in the US
is as high as $7 per hour. In the standard deviation is quite large. Many
illegal immigrants receive a very low wage. This large standard deviation and
the concentration around the very low wages discourage risk averse households
from crossing the border. Second, linear preferences ignore smooth consump-
tion behaviors. In Mexico, wage inequality is large. The poorest households
face the largest wage gap between in the US and Mexico. However, for the
poorest to a¤ord the xed costs of crossing the border illegally, they have
to save a signicant amount of their income. Considering the consumption
smoothing, the poorest nd it too costly to sacrice todays consumption and
save enough to pay the xed costs. Third, trivially, if preferences are linear,
borrowing constraints do not play an important role. I show that a model
with risk averse households can explain the size of illegal immigration.
To investigate the policy questions above, I embed this mechanism into a
two country dynamic general equilibrium model in which the wage, interest
rate, and unemployment rate are endogenously determined in equilibrium. I
extend a model economy with production, search, and unemployment insur-
ance developed by Young (2004). Young (2004) extends Aiyagari (1994) by
introducing job search so that the unemployment rate is endogenous to the
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model, unlike Huggett (1993). Young (2004) also allows my model to mimic
the unemployment benet system very close to the actual US system.
The specic quantitative exercise is to compute a rather extreme policy
reform; the US government deports every illegal immigrant and builds a fence
on the border, unexpectedly. Other policies (Guest Worker Program, etc.)
are somewhere between this extreme policy and status quo. Therefore, the
no-illegal-immigrant policy provides an useful upper bound of the e¤ects of
di¤erent policy reforms. The simulation shows that the aggregate social wel-
fare increases by 0.01% on average and the welfare increases by 0.1 % for the
poorest households. The unemployment rate initially decreases by 0.4%. The
unemployment rate in the new steady state is lower by 0.3% than in the initial
steady state. The wages initially increase by 1% and slowly converge back
to the initial level. The interest rate initially decreases by 4% and slowly
coverage back to the initial level. In sum, this extreme policy has a relative
large impact on the wages and interest rates initially, but a negligible impact
on the social welfare except for the poorest households.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 calibrates the model to the US data and shows how much the model can
explain the puzzle and Section 4 presents the welfare results with the policy
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experiment. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Model
The model economy consists of two countries: Mexico and the United
States. I describe the Mexican economy and US economy separately, and
discuss the aggregation and interaction.
3.2.1 Mexican Economy
I model the Mexican economy without an explicit domestic capital market,
since the capital market in Mexico is not as developed as in the US. Since the
Mexican economy is small compared to the US economy or the world economy,
I also assume that, when there is a change in the Mexican labor force due to
illegal immigration, the (foreign) capital ow in or out of Mexico until the
interest rate in Mexico and the world interest rate coincide. This also implies
that under Cobb-Douglus production function, the wage and interest rate in
Mexico are constant and determined by the world real interest rate. This
mechanism is not explicitly modeled here for the simplicity. THe focus is on
e¤ects in the US and endogenizing the mexican wage would give similar results
in the US.
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The only cross country interaction is illegal migration. There is no trade
of goods. The Mexican model economy consists of a M -measure continuum
of households without access to private insurance markets. Households die




t log ct: (84)
where ct is consumption. Households discount their future utility by  =
e(1   ) where e is the discount factor. Most previous studies assume that
preferences are linear (Borjas, 1987). Linear preferences make uncertainty
about wages in the US and credit constraints unimportant. Therefore, it is
important to assume that households are risk-averse.
I classify Mexican households into three categories: households who have
never crossed the border (potential immigrants), households who are currently
in the US (illegal immigrants), and households who have been to the US and
are currently in Mexico (returners). The di¤erence between the potential
immigrants and the returners is that the potential immigrants do not know
their labor productivity in the US, whereas the returners do know their labor
productivity in the US. In my model, the rst time they go to the US, they
draw a labor productivity from a certain distribution f(): They cannot re-
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draw the labor e¢ ciency in the US labor market by going back and forth
between the two countries. If Mexican households could re-draw their labor
e¢ ciency every time they travel to the US, they would go back and forth until
they draw a very high labor e¢ ciency. To keep every Mexican household from
eventually moving to the US, it is important to assume that they can draw
their productivity in the US only once in their life.
All Mexican households face idiosyncratic (Mexican) wage shocks, !t. For
the immigrants, these idiosyncratic shocks can be considered as a job o¤er
from home. After realizing the wage shocks, they decide to be in Mexico or
in the US. Every time they cross the border illegally, they have to incur costs
of "coyote price", ; for smugglers so that they can cross the border without
being caught by the border patrol. Hanson (2006) report that recently most
illegal immigrants use smugglers because the US government has changed the
border patrol policy and the number of people who get killed, trying to cross
the border, has been increasing. Thus, I do not allow Mexican households
to cross the border without using the smugglers. I also assume that there
is no credit market in Mexico. However, they can self-insure the wage risk
or nance the coyote price by saving as a form of cash, mt: The nancial
market in Mexico is not as developed as in the United States. Further, if
92
a bank does not have an incentive to lend any resource to those who may
attempt to cross the border and may never come back. Thus, this incomplete
market assumption seems reasonable. The budget constraint for the potential
immigrants and returners who remain in Mexico is given by
ct +mt+1  !t +mt (85)
Those who are crossing the border in the current period is given by
ct +mt+1  mt    (86)
The budget constraint for the immigrants who stay in the US is given by
ct +mt+1  wtt +mt (87)
where wt is the US wage level and t is the labor productivity in the US.
Finally, the budget constraint for the immigrants who return to Mexico is
given by
ct +mt+1  mt (88)
Since m is cash, m  0: I also assume that they do not have an access to the
US capital market. The unemployment rate or the duration of unemployment
of illegal immigrants is unknown. Since this study focuses more on the welfare
of the US households, instead of the Mexican households, I assume that the
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ow of illegal immigrants are solely driven by the job opportunity that they
have in Mexico. For example, one might decide to come to the US illegally
when he receives the lowest productivity shock in Mexico. A few periods
later, he may receive a good productivity shock (a good job o¤er) in Mexico,
and then he may decide to go back to Mexico. Thus, without unemployment
shocks in the US, the model can generate migration ows.
3.2.2 US Economy
The US economy is almost identical to Young (2004). The US model
economy consists of a unit-measure continuum of households without access
to private insurance markets, as in a standard Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagary econ-
omy. One of the major contribution of Young (2004) is to introduce labor
search and endogenize the unemployment rate that is also an important vari-
able in my study of illegal immigration. The US economy does have a capital
market and the equilibrium interest rates and wages are also endogenously
determined, based on the aggregate amount of capital and labor in the United
States. This element is also necessary for my study since academic researchers
and policy makers are concerned about a possible decrease in wages because
of a large illegal immigrant population. Further, the environment also allows
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me to model a realistic unemployment benet system. A lack of the realistic
unemployment benet system may mislead my social welfare analysis since
without unemployment benet there would be households with a very small
amount of capital whose indirect utility is signicantly low.












where ct is consumption and at is job search/retention e¤ort.  measures the
curvature of the disutility of e¤ort function. The coe¢ cient of relative risk
aversion is :
Timing within a period is as follows. At the beginning of the period,
employed households engage in job-retention e¤ort and unemployed households
engages in job-search e¤ort, realizing the wages and interest rates for this
period. A household retains or receives a job in the current period with
probability
Pr("t = 1jet = j) = 1  exp( jat) (90)
where et denotes the agents relevant employment history and "t denotes cur-
rent job status that is, "t = 1 denotes an individual who is currently employed
and "t = 0 is one who is currently unemployed, and an an agent in state et = j
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has j consecutive periods of unemployment, up to some maximum J: There
are no job rejections.
After observing the outcome of their job retention/search outcome, house-
holds make a consumption/savings decision. They face a budget constraint
such that
ct + kt+1 = kt + (1  )(rtkt + "twt) + (1  "t)btwt (91)
where kt is current capital, rt and wt represent the interest rate and wage,  is
the income tax rate used to nance the unemployment insurance system, and
bt is the unemployment benet replacement rate. They also face a borrowing
constraint: kt+s  k:
There also exist a continuum of identical rms in the US economy. The
production function takes a standard Cobb-Douglas form





where Kt is the aggregate level of capital and Nt is the sum of individual labor
productivity of native workers as well as illegal immigrants. This implies that







t    (93)
wt = (1  )Kt N t (94)
where  is a capital depreciation rate.
The US government collects income taxes and distributes benets which
cannot be contingent on e¤ort levels, as these e¤orts are unobservable to the
government. It sets a benet structure (bet)1e=0 and a at tax rate  to satisfy
the budget constraint




where ut denotes the unemployment rate and uet is the amount of unemployed
in state e and thus receiving benets wetbet: Unlike Young (2004), the unem-
ployment benet depends of the previous wage as oppose to the current wage
rate in the economy, although this specication does not make any di¤erence
in a steady state analysis. This specication becomes important in the policy
experiment.
3.2.3 Recursive Representation of the Model
The economy admits a recursive representation for the householdsprob-
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lems. Especially for Mexican households, it is easier to see their maximization
problems in a recursive form since they make discrete choices. I also study
only a steady state in this section.




maxfm0g log(m+ !  m0) + E!0j!Vp(m0; !0);
maxfm0g log(m m0   ) + E;!0j!Vi(m0; !0; )
9>>=>>;
(96)
Vi(m;!; ) = max
8>><>>:
maxfm0g log(m m0) + E!0j!Vr(m0; !0; );
maxfm0g log(m+ w m0) + E!0j!Vi(m0; !0; )
9>>=>>;
(97)
Vr(m;!; ) = max
8>><>>:
maxfm0g log(m+ !  m0) + E!0j!Vr(m0; !0; );
maxfm0g log(m m0   ) + E!0j!Vi(m0; !0; )
9>>=>>;
(98)
respectively. The reason for distinguishing the potential immigrants from the
returners is not to allow households to travel back and forth just to get a
good draw for : The solutions to the discrete choice problems are denoted
as p;i; and r; where  = 1 if an agent decides to be in Mexico. The
optimal savings functions are denoted as p;i; and r:
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The Bellman equation for the US households is


















I denote  as the optimal savings function and  as the optimal e¤ort function.
Letting  (k; e) denote a distribution of capital for di¤erent employment
histories, Gp(m;!); Gi(m;!; ); and Gr(m;!; ) denote the distributions for
cash for the potential immigrants, the illegal immigrants, and the returners,
respectively, I can formally dene the following object:
Denition 1 (Stationary Recursive Competitive Equilibrium). A
stationary recursive competitive equilibrium for this economy consists of a
value functions fv; V = (Vp; Vi; V r)g; savings functions f; = (p;i;r)g;
an e¤ort function, f g; migration decision functions f = (p;i;r)g;
equilibrium prices r(K;N) and w(K;N), an unemployment insurance system
( ; (be)
J
e=0); and an invariant distribution f ; G = (Gp; Gi; Gr)g such that
1. V;; and  solve the Mexican householdsproblems given prices, policy
variables, and G;
2. v; ; and  solve the US householdsproblems given prices, policy
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variables, and  ;
3. the (US) capital market clears: K =
R
kd (k; e);
4. the (US) labor market clears: N =
R
[1  exp( ea)] d (k; e) +R
dGi(m;!; );
11
5. K and N solve the rms problem given prices;
6. the government budget constraint holds;
7.   and G are invariant.
3.3 Numerical Analysis
3.3.1 Calibration
In the previous section, I left the earnings process and the distribution of
labor productivity in the US for Mexican households rather ambiguous to keep
the expressions simple. For calibration, I need to parameterize the earnings
process and the labor e¢ ciency distribution. I set the number of elements
for the Mexican wages, !; to three, so 
 = f!1; !2; !3g and set !2 such thatP
i 

i log(!i)   log(w) to be the actual US-Mexico log wage di¤erence from
11Storesletten (1999) also uses a similar labor market clearing condition to aggregate the
native and immigrant workersproductivity.
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the data, where i is the unconditional probability of !i for i = 1; 2; 3: I
choose the transition matrix to reproduce the moments in the data with the

















Then, the total number of free parameters is three: the transition probability




i = 1; 2; 3:
The moments available and useful are:













2. given that 1 + 

2  12  








p is assumed to be between the persistent for the US earnings process and
1 since the less developed countries have relatively high persistent earnings
process especially for the poor (no American dream). The simulation results
do not seem to matter as long as p is in this range.
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I also assume that the labor e¢ ciency in the US for the illegal immigrants
is log-normally distributed since the log-normal distribution seems to t the
wage distribution from the data fairly well and is typically used in the previ-
ous studies. Formally, the log-normal distribution is characterized with two
parameters  and  such that
log   N(; ): (103)
These two parameters are calibrated using the data set from the Mexican
Migration Project 114.
The rest of parameters are calibrated to match certain observations in the
US data. I set  = 0:36;which is capital share of income in the post-war period.
The model period is one quarter of a year. To study the unemployment rate
and the duration of unemployment, frequency of the model period needs to be
short. At the same time, the model cannot be computationally too demanding.
A quarterly model seems to be the optimal choice in these regards. The death
probability, ; is set to be 1
460 so that households live for 60 years on average
after entering the labor market. The depreciation rate  is set to be 0.025
from NIPA. I set the discount factor, e = 0:99; which roughly matches the
capital/output ratio. The parameters, 0; 1; and 2 in the search functions
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are calibrated to replicate the following features of the US distribution of
unemployment, estimated from CPS data by Wang and Williamson (2001):
total unemployment is 7:4%, 69:8% of the unemployed are in state e = 0; and
15:5% of the unemployed are in state e = 1 for the baseline unemployment
insurance (UI) system, which is described below. Finally, the borrowing
constraint is set to zero,  = 1; and  = 2:
The baseline UI system matches the US system as closely as computation-
ally feasible as in Young (2004). In the US, the duration of unemployment
benet is approximately 6 months (i.e. J = 2) and the replacement rate is
around 50% of the last wage earned. The replacement rate for welfare pay-
ments after the government stops the unemployment benet provision is 17%.
This implies that b0 = b1 = 0:5 and bj2 = 0:17:
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Table 3.1 (Calibration)
Description Parameter Value Matched Moments or Source
Discount factor  0.99 Capital/Output ratio
Capital share  0.36 NIPA
Depreciation rate  0.025 NIPA
CRRA  1 Young (2004)
Disutility of e¤orts  2 Young (2004)
Search parameters 0 10.59 CPS
1 2.96 CPS
2 1.27 CPS
UI replacement b0; b1 0.5 Wang & Williamson (1996)
Welfare replacement b2 0.17 Wang & Williamson (1996)
Death probability  1/240 Average life span
Size of Mexico M 0.27 (Mexican Labor Force)/(US Labor Force)
3.3.2 Explaining the Size of Illegal Immigration
There is one more deep parameter to calibrate in the model, which is
the coyote price, : What labor economists have found puzzling is that the
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number of illegal immigrants from Mexico to the US is too small, given the
huge wage gap and the observable costs of crossing the border illegally, when
the preference is linear. I claim that the model with risk averse households can
explain the size of illegal immigration without introducing any unobservable
variables such as disutility from being away from home.
Cornelius (2005) documents that the average coyote prices between 1996
and 1998, and 2002 and 2004, were $1180 and $1680, respectively. I choose 
such that di¤erence between the predicted number of illegal immigrants in the
calibrated model and the actual number of illegal immigrants from Mexico is
minimized. The implied coyote prices in the model are $1063, which is very
close to Corneliuss estimation, and at the same time, the predicted number
of illegal immigrants is very close to what we observe in the data.
Therefore, a simple idea of the wage inequality and the credit constraint in
Mexico can explain the size of illegal immigration, without taking into account
any other unobservable costs which Hanson (2006) claims to be important.
In equilibrium, the poorest Mexican households do not cross the border since
they cannot a¤ord to hire the smugglers. The richest households also do not
cross the border since the benet of crossing the border is too small. Thus,
most illegal immigrants are middle income households. This result is also
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consistent with some empirical ndings from the previous labor literature;
labor economists nd that the middle income group is more likely to cross the
border illegally than the low income group or the high income group.
3.4 Policy Experiment and Welfare Analysis
So far, I have shown that the model developed here is consistent with the
moments from the US and Mexican data, including the coyote prices, the wage
gaps, and the number of illegal immigrants. I use this reasonable normative
model to address some positive economic questions regarding immigration pol-
icy reforms. More specically, I compute a transition from the benchmark
economy to an economy with no illegal immigrants by deporting every illegal
immigrant and building a wall between the US and Mexico.
The computation of this class of transition can be done by solving the
model backward from the new steady state to the old steady state as in Young
(2004). However, when the unemployment benet depends on the previous
wage, instead of the current wage for those who are employed, a simple back-
ward induction cannot be used since there is no way to identify ones previous
wage or ones employment history.
Therefore, I simulate the model forward, instead of backward, using the
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method innovated by Krusell and Smith (1999), although there is no aggre-
gate uncertainty in the model. I approximate the distribution of capital across
di¤erent employment histories by the aggregate capital level. The (US) house-
holdsproblem can be rewritten as















c+ k0  k + (1  )(r(K;N)k + w(K;N)") + ewbe(1  ") (105)
K 0 = eK0 + eK1 K + eK2 K2 + eK3 pK (106)
N = eN0 + eN1 K + eN2 K2 + eN3 pK (107)
 = e0 + e1K + e2K2 + e3pK (108)
Table 2 summarizes the OLS results for the coe¢ cients for these laws of motion
forK 0; N;and  : In this specication, every regression coe¢ cient is statistically
signicant and R2 is greater than 0:99: Any simpler specication generates a
signicantly low R2:
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Table 3.2 (The Laws of Motion)
K 0 N 
K 1:29E 2 8:94E 6  5:37E 6
K2 1:37E 2 2:37E 6  2:79E 6
p
K 1:43E 2 2:44E 6  2:91E 6
cons: 17:66 0:92 3:31E 2
R2 0:9993 0:9903 0:9985
Figure 1 and 2 show how aggregate capital, the unemployment rate, the
interest rate, and the wage change over the transition. The aggregate capital
level gradually decreases since the US economy has lost the labor force without
any capital. The unemployment rate initially decreases only by 0:4%; which is
surprising since the initial increase in the wage is almost 1%. The initial drop
of the interest rate is 4%. Thus, this extreme policy does have a signicant
impact of the interest rates and wages.
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Figure 3.1 (Transitions of the Aggregate Capital and the Unemployment Rate)
If I computed the transition assuming that the unemployment benet depends
on the current economy-wide wage level, as opposed to the previous wage level,
the unemployment rate initially increases since the unemployed also get benet
from the increase in the current wage because of the sudden decrease in N .
However, in the simulation I performed here, the unemployed realize that the
wage suddenly increased and put more e¤orts to search for a job. This scenario
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is much more realistic and intuitive. Therefore, it is important to simulate
the model forward, using Krusell-Smith algorithm.
Figure 3.2 (Transition of the Interest Rates and Wages)
Figure 3 represents the welfare gain of agents as a function of their initial
state (k; e): The y-axis indicates (k; e) such that
W1(k; e) =W0(k; e) +
1
1   log(1 + (k; e)) (109)
whereW0 is the expected utility in the baseline case andW1 is expected utility
under the policy change. Thus, the least wealthy households gain by 0.1%,
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which is fairly large, and the most wealthy households loose by 0.3% when
taking the transition into consideration. However, the welfare e¤ects are much
smaller when just comparing the two initial and end steady state because of
the standard general equilibrium e¤ects. This implies that if the number of
illegal immigrants change gradually, the impact on the unemployment rate,
the interest rate, and the wages is very small.
Figure 3.3 (Welfare Analysis)
To fully understand Figure 3, it is important to show the distribution of
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wealth. Figure 4 plots the initial distribution of wealth that is the invariant
distribution of wealth in the benchmark economy. It has the usual shape as in
Young (2004); there is a concentration of agents with little or no wealth. In-
troduction of death probability helps the model to increase the Gini coe¢ cient
on wealth (0.8 in the model and 0.78 in the data). Since the households are
concentrated toward zero capital, 64% of households get better o¤ from this
policy changes, so that majority voting would implement this extreme policy
reform, assuming that the tangible costs (sending all the illegal immigrants
back to Mexico and building a wall) are negligible. However, once I aggregate
the welfare and nd  such that
Z
W1(k; e)d (k; e) =
Z
W0(k; e)d (k; e) +
1




Figure 3.4 (Invariant Distribution of Asset in a Stationary Equilibrium)
3.5 Conclusion
This study is one of the rst studies to explain the size of illegal immigration
without introducing any unobservable variables such as disutility from being
away from home, and investigate the welfare e¤ects of the immigrant policy
reforms by using a solid micro-founded dynamic general equilibrium model
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and serious calibration. What labor economists have found puzzling is that
the number of illegal immigrants from Mexico to the US is too small given the
huge wage gap between Mexico and the US and the small unobservable costs
of crossing the border illegally (Hanson, 2006). A simple two country Bewley-
Huggett-Aiyagari class of model can explain the size of illegal immigration
with a reasonable xed cost of crossing the border illegally since the Mexican
households who could potentially get most benet by crossing the border are
actually facing the tight credit constraint and cannot nance payments to the
smugglers.
In the model developed here, the unemployment rate, the wage, and the
interest rate are all endogenously determined in equilibrium, which allows me
to provide some answers to a hot policy debate regarding the immigration
policy reform. The particular experiment I considered here is to suddenly
deport all the illegal immigrants and build a fence. This extreme policy re-
form predicts that the interest rate will initially decrease by 4%, the wage will
initially increase by 1%, and the unemployment rate will initially decrease by
0.4%. Most of the previous studies tried to estimate these e¤ects, but they
stopped there. What the policy makers are ultimately interested in is the
welfare e¤ects on di¤erent individuals. When considering the transition, the
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poorest households gain welfare by 0.1%, which is fairly large, and the richest
households loose welfare by 0.3%, whereas without considering the transition,
these e¤ects are 10 times smaller and almost negligible. The transition sim-
ulation also shows that this rather extreme policy change would be popular
(more than 60% of households get better o¤), although on average the social
welfare increases only by 0.01%.
There are some weaknesses in this study. First, due to the lack of data
availability for illegal immigrants from countries other than Mexico, I ignored
these illegal immigrants that account for approximately 40% of the total illegal
immigrants. If their characteristics are not too far from those of Mexican
illegal immigrants, the e¤ects on the prices, the unemployment rate, and the
welfare may be signicantly larger.
Second, I did not allow Mexican households to legally immigrants to the
US. The number of legal immigrants from Mexico is smaller than the number
of illegal immigrants and legal immigrants are typically wealthy since the visa
application is very costly. Therefore, legal immigration policy reform is still an
important topic, but only marginally related to the illegal immigration policy
reform, although it may not look that way.
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